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This case was filed in the Third Judicial District Court by Appellant Bob Henry 
("Henry") seeking a ruling of the court requiring Respondent Canyon County and former 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney John Bujak ("Bujak") to produce bank records relating to 
proceeds paid to Bujak pursuant to a contract with the City of Nampa for misdemeanor and 
infraction prosecution services. Henry had made several requests to Bujak, as the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney, and the County (including various elected officials in the County), 
and it was undisputed that all records had been produced to Henry that were in the County's 
possession and control. (R. Vol. II, p. 354: 21-22.) Bujak did not produce to Henry bank records 
for accounts in which he deposited the sums paid to him by the City pursuant to the contract. 
Judge Sticklen concluded that the requested bank records were not public records of either 
Canyon County or the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and were not documents 
that related to the duties of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney. She concluded that the 
records were Bujak's private records, and that the County had produced all records that it had in 
its possession that were responsive to the public records request. (R. Vol. 11, p. 354: 16-23.) 
This appeal followed. 
Henry requests this Court to "compel Canyon County, the Canyon County Prosecutor's 
office, and the Canyon County Prosecutor to allow him to examine and copy of [sic] all public 
records related to the contract entered into between Canyon County, the Canyon County 
Prosecutor, and the City of Nampa, including all records related to the assessment, collection, 
safekeeping, management and disbursement of the monies belonging to Canyon County." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 2.) Because it is uncontested that Canyon County has produced all 
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decision relating to those particular documents. 
Dramatic events have occurred since the issuance of Judge Sticklen's decision that have 
changed the core issue on this appeal and have made it moot. On September 3 0, 20 l 0, Bujak 
tendered his resignation as the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney and subsequently filed for 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Bryan F. Taylor ("Taylor") has been appointed to fill the remaining 
months of Bujak's term. Because the underlying petition named Bujak as a respondent in his 
official capacity as the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney, Taylor has now been substituted as 
a party in Bujak's place in this appeal pursuant to Rule 25(d), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
With the substitution of Taylor in Bujak's stead, none of the respondents have, or ever have had, 
the documents sought by Henry. Taylor and Canyon County desire to make the documents 
public if, and when, they are obtained through the bankruptcy court proceedings. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is an appeal ofI-Ienry's petition in the Third Judicial District Court seeking an order 
compelling the production of documents that were claimed to be public records. Judge Sticklen 
held that Canyon County and the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office had produced all 
documents that were public records, and that the remaining documents sought by Henry were 
Bujak's private records which were not subject to disclosure. 
B. Course of proceedings. 
Canyon County concurs with Henry's statement on the course of proceedings in his brief. 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents essentially concur with Henry's statement of facts to the extent they are 
referenced to specific portions of the record. Canyon County does not, however, concur with 
Henry's editorial comments regarding the meaning of those facts. In addition, this Court must 
restrict its review to the evidence presented to the District Court and may not consider the 
irrelevant new facts and documents submitted with Henry's brief. Wattenbarger v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc., _Idaho_, 246 P.3d 961, 976-977 (20 I 0). 
Henry makes certain representations on pp. 15-18 of his brief regarding positions taken 
by "Canyon County" in the underlying petition that is on appeal herein and in the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding filed by Bujak, and claims that it is taking contrary positions. Henry 
collectively refers to Taylor and the County as "Canyon County" in his brief. However, Taylor 
was not a party to the underlying petition and did not take any position in that proceeding, and he 
is not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Henry has carefully crafted his facts to support a claim that Canyon County has taken 
conflicting positions in the underlying District Court and the Bujak bankruptcy proceedings. 
Henry cites to Canyon County's Memorandum in Supp01i of Its Motion to Dismiss the Petition 
(R. Vol, II, pp. 300-303) and infers that the position taken in that document differs from the 
bankruptcy complaint filed by the County, which is attached to his brief. The underlying petition 
in this case was simply a request for an order of the court compelling production of certain 
documents which Henry claimed to be public records. Canyon County's position in its motion to 
dismiss was that it had produced all of the documents that it had in its possession responsive to 
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the request, and that the only remaining documents to be produced were documents relating to 
Bujak's private accounts to which the County did not have access. 
Regardless of whether the funds in the account were being held for Canyon County or 
were Bujak's private funds (which is the issue in the bankruptcy proceeding), the requested 
documents were only associated with Bujak's private accounts and it is not relevant whether the 
account was an IO LT A account or other private account. There has been no contrary 
representation in the bankruptcy proceeding that the money was in Canyon County accounts. 
Henry's brief distorts the facts by repeatedly referring to the trust account in which Bujak 
deposited the Nampa funds as the "Canyon County Trust Account," which infers that it was an 
account owned by the County. There is no fact to support this inference and the account was not 
owned or controlled by the County. 
Henry also cites to the transcript in which counsel for Canyon County made the assertion 
at the hearing with Judge Sticklen that the contract was a private contract between Bujak and 
Nampa. While these statements by counsel for the County cannot be disputed, it is instructive to 
note that the motion documents filed by Canyon County-including an affidavit of David 
Ferdinand (R. Vol. II, pp. 304-306), the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners-only 
took the position that regardless of whether the contract was public or private, the County did not 
have access to the requested documents. Judge Sticklen accurately characterized Canyon 
County's position in her Memorandum Decision. (R. Vol. II, p. 3 53: 11-12.) 
Underlying this entire argument by Henry is the fact that this is an appeal of a decision by 
Judge Sticklen that found that the bank records were not public records subject to disclosure 
under the Public Records Act and did not relate to the duties of the County Prosecuting Attorney. 
Canyon County's position in the bankruptcy court is frankly irrelevant as it does not illuminate 
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whether or not Judge Sticklen's decision was correct. The reference to this bankruptcy position 
is nothing more than an attempt by Henry to divert attention from Judge Sticklen's decision, 
which is the only subject of this appeal. 
IV. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Henry asserts seven issues on appeal regarding Judge Sticklen's Memorandum Decision 
and Order. Notwithstanding these issues, Canyon County asserts that the appeal is resolved by 
one issue: Is the appeal moot because neither Taylor or the Canyon County Board of County 
Commissioners have possession of Bujak's private bank records, and do not have the power to 
compel their production? 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal has been made moot by Bujak's resignation as the elected Canyon County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and his replacement as a party by Taylor, pursuant to Rule 25(d), Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The core issue in this appeal is that regardless of whether the decision of Judge Sticklen 
was correct or incorrect, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed because notwithstanding any 
decision of this Court regarding whether the contract and the Nampa funds are public or private, 
Taylor and Canyon County do not have the ability to compel production of the requested 
documents. There is no dispute that Canyon County and its elected officials have produced all 
documents that are in their possession that have been requested by Henry. (R. Vol. II, p. 354: 
21-22.) Although Henry incorrectly characterizes the account for which records are sought as 
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the "Canyon County Trust Account," the account is not, and has never been, a Canyon County 
account. 
In Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008), this Court held that "an 
issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of 
being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Id. at 163, 177 P.3d at 377 (internal 
quotations omitted). This Court recognized that the case was moot because even if the case was 
remanded to the district court, that court could not fashion any specific relief requested by the 
plaintiffs. Id. Likewise, in the present case, there is no relief that this Court or the District Court 
can grant. Taylor and Canyon County do not have, nor ever have had, the documents that Henry 
seeks. If Bujak were still a party, no such mootness argument would be applicable. An order of 
the Court finding the documents to be public records would have compelled Bujak to produce 
them. 
In Koch, this Court also noted three exceptions to the mootness doctrine, none of which 
are applicable in this case, that would allow a court to decide an otherwise moot issue: "(I) 
when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the 
issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of 
repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest." 
Id. (internal quotations omitted.) 
The first exception does not apply as there are no legal consequences that will be 
imposed on Henry. The second exception does not apply because the particular facts of this 
case, i.e. Bujak's resignation, are unlikely to be repeated with regularity so as to cause the issue 
to evade judicial review. While there is public interest in knowing what Bujak did with the 
Nampa funds, the third exception does not apply because even if this Court finds that the 
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contract and the proceeds are not private and that the account documents are public records, there 
is still no remedy that this Court can fashion to compel the production of the documents. 
Taylor and Canyon County have no interest in defending Bujak's position and welcome 
the opportunity to disclose the records relating to Bujak's account. Nevertheless, the issues in 
this case are moot as Respondents do not have, and never have had, the requested documents and 
cannot produce them. This Court must, therefore, dismiss the appeal as moot. 
VI. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Henry is requesting an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § § 9-344(2), 12-
117 and 12-121. In a recent case that involved the appeal of an administrative land use decision 
of a county, this Court held that Idaho Code § 12-117 was the exclusive provision for an award 
of attorney fees in a civil judicial proceeding involving a political subdivision in the state of 
Idaho, and that § 12-121 did not provide any basis for an award of attorney fees. Smith v. 
Washington County, 2010 WL 5093625, p.4, _ P.3d _ (2010). This court's decision in 
Smith was limited specifically to the interplay between§ 12-117 and§§ 12-120 or 12-121. It did 
not address the interplay between§ 12-117 and§ 9-344(2), which section specifically provides 
for an award of attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in a proceeding which seeks to 
enforce the right to examine or receive public records. 
Section 12-117 allows for an award of attorney fees in a civil judicial proceeding that 
involves a political subdivision when "the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law." Section 9-344(2) allows an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party if "the 
request or refusal to provide records was frivolously pursued." Since the frivolous standard of 
§ 9-344(2) is specific to this proceeding, it is the applicable standard for an award of attorney 
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fees in this action. However, Henry cannot be awarded attorney fees in this case under either of 
these provisions. 
Henry's principle contention in this appeal in support of his request for attorney fees is 
that the position taken by Canyon County in the Bujak bankruptcy proceedings is contrary to the 
position by Canyon County in the District Court and shows that Respondents' position is 
frivolous. No such conclusion can be reached. Henry fails to recognize that § 9-344 allows for 
the award of fees only if the County's refusal to provide the record was frivolously pursued. The 
position taken by Canyon County in the bankruptcy proceedings has nothing to do with whether 
the Count{s inability to produce the requested documents to Henry was frivolously asserted. 
Moreover, Taylor was not a party to the underlying proceeding in the District Court, and he does 
not have, and has never had, the requested documents. 
Henry also fails to recognize that he was the nonprevailing party in the underlying 
District Court proceeding. Judge Sticklen adopted the position asserted by Bujak, and had a 
reasonable basis in fact and law to adopt that position in the Memorandum Decision. If 
anything, Henry is in danger of frivolously pursuing this appeal in light of the fact that he knows 
that neither Canyon County or Taylor can produce the records. Notwithstanding whether it 
would have been beneficial to Canyon County and the public for the documents to be disclosed, 
that should not divert the attention from the fact that Bujak's position was not frivolously 
pursued and was, in fact, adopted by Judge Sticklen. 
Although Respondents do not have an interest in asserting the position Bujak took in the 
District Court, it does not mean that his position was frivolous or without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. In Derting v. Walker, 112 Idaho 1055, 739 P.2d 354 (1987), this Court reviewed the 
legal status of contracts entered into between a county prosecuting attorney and municipalities 
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for misdemeanor prosecution services, and the nature of funds paid to the prosecutor for those 
services. To support his argument that Derting does not apply to this action, Henry has attached 
a resolution of the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners as an exhibit to his brief, 
showing that the contract in Derting was expressly contemplated to be private, and he asserts that 
the Nampa contract was not so contemplated. Such distinction, however, is not supported by the 
clear language of Derting and the provisions of§ 31-3113. 
Section 31-3113 expressly states that "prosecuting attorneys" may enter into contracts 
with a city to prosecute nonconflicting misdemeanors and infractions. It does not say that 
counties may enter into such agreements. Although this section has been amended since the 
Derting decision, the amendment is irrelevant to the resolution of the issues in this case. In 
reaching its decision in Derting, this Court contemplated contracts beyond the specific contract 
for services that the prosecutor had in the Derting case: 
Clearly, the monies collected by Walker and other prosecutors throughout the 
state as a result of contracts with municipalities, do not constitute fees in that 
context, nor are the monies received for the performance of the "duties" of the 
office of prosecuting attorney. Rather, they are personal funds received in his 
capacity as a private individual for the performance of contractual obligations not 
relating to the duties of the office of prosecuting attorney. 
Id. at 1057, 739 P.2d at 356 (italics added). 
Henry asserts that the amendment to § 31-3113 makes reliance upon Derting improper in 
this case. However, the language of§ 31-3113 at the time of the Derting decision actually made 
it less likely that the funds from the contract would be private funds of the prosecuting attorney. 
When Derting was decided, § 31-3113 specifically required the prosecuting attorney in Kootenai 
County, as well as other counties including Canyon County, to devote full time to the discharge 
of the duties as the prosecuting attorney. This Court rejected Kootenai County's assertion that 
because the prosecutor was required to devote full time to his duties, any revenue from the city 
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contracts would be county money, Id. at 1058, 739 P.2d at 357. Section 31-3113 does not now 
contain any such requirement for full time devotion to the duties of a prosecuting attorney and 
prosecuting attorneys have the statutory ability to contract with cities for prosecution services. 
Henry also relies upon Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Department of 
Agriculture, 143 Idaho 366, 146 P.3d 632 (2006) and Ward v. Portneuf Medical Center, Inc., 
2011 WL 3103 83, _Idaho_ (2011 ), but those cases are inapposite to the issues in this case. In 
each of those cases, the governmental entity at one time had possession of the requested public 
records, but had divested itself of them. In fact, in Ward, the governmental entity had possession 
of the records at the time the public records request was made. Moreover, there was no question 
in those cases that the records were public records. It is axiomatic that a governmental entity 
could not avoid the responsibilities of the public records act by divesting itself of public records. 
In the present case, Taylor and Canyon County never had possession of the requested documents. 
Notwithstanding the reasonable, non-frivolous basis for reliance upon Derting, Canyon 
County and Taylor disclaim any interest in protecting the information contained in the Bujak 
accounts from disclosure to the public, and will provide those documents if, and when, they 
obtain them through the Bujak bankruptcy proceedings or otherwise, and have made that position 
known to Henry. 
Henry contends that Bujak and employees of his office frivolously denied the request by 
allegedly misrepresenting the mathematical formula that showed how all funds from the contract 
would be paid to the County. Respondents' cannot speak for Bujak's intent, but there is no 
support for the assertion that Bujak's employees knew that, in fact, Bujak would not comply with 
his representation to the County and the public on this issue. 
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Henry's brief also suggests that had Canyon County just listened to him, it could have 
ultimately avoided the severe consequences of the Bujak situation. However, the fact remains 
that this proceeding is an appeal of the decision of the District Court that Bujak bank account 
records were not subject to the Public Records Act. This case is not about, and does not hinge 
on, what would have been revealed by those records. Henry has wholly failed to show that 
Taylor's and Canyon County's positions have been frivolous or without any reasonable basis in 
fact or law and he is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
Henry's issues raised on appeal are moot. Taylor and Canyon County do not have, and 
have never had, the records sought by Henry to be produced, and this appeal must be denied. 
Moreover, Henry has not shown that Taylor and Canyon County have refused to produce the 
documents for a frivolous reason, or that their position lacks any reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Thus, Henry's request for attorney fees must be denied. 
Dated: March 
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2011. 
BRYANF. TAYLOR 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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